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This is an appeal by Berkshire Investments, Thomas Maile and Co11een Maile, from a 
Judgment dismissing the Appellants' complaint, and a Judb'ment entered February 28, 2011 on 
the trust's counter-claim. The dispute evolved from a real estate transaction between the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller (refclTed to as the "trust") and Berkshire 
Investments, as buyer. The Appellants filed their complaint against the Respondents alleging 
celiain wrongfltl conduct including criminal conduct, fi'audulent misrepresentations, and t011ious 
conduct relating to a pIior consolidated case captioned Taylor v. Maile. The AppeIIants assert 
multiple claims against the Respondents, to wit: (1) committing a fraud upon the court, (2) an 
imposition of a constructive trust, (3) tOliious interference with contract, (4) tortious interference 
of prospective economic advantage and/or opportunity, (5) committing acts that constitute abuse 
of process, (6) committing acts constituting negligence, (7) violating criminal statutes which 
amount to Negligence Per Se, (8) committing acts constituting f:,rross negligence, (9) committing 
acts amounting to equitable estoppel, (10) committing acts amounting to quasi estoppel, (1 I) 
committing acts in violations under Chapter 18 Title 78 of the I.e. (Racketeeling), (ll) 
committing acts which constitute judicial estoppel. The Respondents, The Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust, DaIlan Taylor, and R. Jo1m Taylor filed their counter-clam alleging abuse of 
process, slander of title, and tOliious interference of prospective economic advantage. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
complaint was filed by the Appellants on December 31, 2007. "An Amended 
Complaint was filed on March 25, 2008 (R. Vall. p. 000060). The Respondents filed their 
Answers in May 2008. The Respondents filed their Motion to Dismiss/Motions for Summary 
Judb,'lnent. The parties filed pleadings in support and opposition to the motions. The trust & the 
Taylor brothers filed their ,Amended Answer and Counter-claim on Feb11lary 17, 2009 (R. Vol 1. 
p.001019). Clark & Feeney, Connie Taylor & Paul T. Clark filed their Amended Answer and 
Counter-cIaim on March 13,2009 (R. Vol 1. p. 001030). The Appellants filed their Motion for 
Summary Judgment and supporting affidavits on March 17,2009 (R. Vol 1. p. 01042). The 
Honorable Richard Greenwood, b,Trantcd the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judf,rment 
dismissing the Appellants' claims by an Order entered July 2,2009 (R. Vol 1. p. 001363). The 
District Court, reasoned that the claims of the Appellants were baITed by res judicata. 
The counter-claims of Clark & Feeney, Connie Taylor and Paul T. Clark were dismissed 
by stipUlation on December 2, 2010 CR. Vol 1. p. 001882). The counter-claims of The Theodore 
L. Johnson Revocable Trust, DalIan Taylor, and R. John Taylor proceeded to jury trial resulting 
in a judgment against the Appellants on February 4,2011 (R. Vol 1. p. 002408). On March 7, 
2011, the Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal (R. Vol 1. p. 0(2438). 
Pursuant to post-trial motions the District Court entered its Order on May 9,2011, 
denying the Appellants' Motion for JNOV (R. Vol 1. p. 002521). The District Court awarded the 
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Respondents Clark & Feeney their costs and attorneys fees and fuliher awarded the Respondent 
trust its costs (R. Vol 1. p. 002524). 
c. 
This Court previously considered celiain issues involving the Appellants and The 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and R. John Taylor, in the 
consolidated case captioned, Taylor v. Maile. Addendum "A" is a condensed recital of sworn 
verified statements, portions of deposition testimony, declarations against interests of key facts 
suppol1ing the Appellants' claims. 
Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and R. John Taylor, as beneficiaries of the trust filed, their 
complaint against the Appellants on January 23,2004 (T. E. 110 p. 385). The Honorable Judge 
Ronald Wilper, entered 11is Order dismissing the claims of the Taylors ruling that as beneficiaries 
the Taylors did not have standing to pursue their claims on their behalf or on behalf of the trust 
(R. Vol 1. p. 000198 In. 19). On June 4,2004, the Taylor brothers filed their Notice of Appeal 
regarding the Order dismissing the beneficiaries compLtint CR. Vol 1. p. 000211 In. 9). 
On April 14, 2004, Connie Taylor drafted a letter to Bart Harwood which establisbed that 
bel' clients, the Taylor brothers would disclaim their rights as beneficiaries of the trust in 
exchange for tIle successor nominated trustees, Beth Roger's cooperation and sUlTender of her 
trustee status, which would allow tbe Taylor brothers to gain control of the trust (R. Vol 1. p. 
000561). On July 15, 2004, the Taylors entered i11to a "Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity 
A~rreement" with the nominated successor trustees and all other beneficimies of the trust (R. Vol 
1. p. 000611- annexed as Addendum B). 
The Taylors pursuant to the Disclaimer, assuming they \vere the successor trustees of the 
trust filed a new Complaint against the Appellants on July 19, 2004. (Case 33 1 R. Vall. p. 
00005). While the Taylor brothers' appeal was pending, the cun-ent Appellants had claims 
pending against the Taylor brothers and the trust in the two consolidated cases before the 
Honorable Judge \Vilper (Case 3378l R. Vall. p. 000(53). 
On October 20, 2004, the Appellants filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Tlial/Motion for Summary Judgment relating to the "trust's" complaint. One of 
the issues raised by the Appellants in their Motion to Dismiss was the issue of the legitimacy of 
the complaint filed by the "trust" since the alleged successor trustees, (the individual Taylors) 
had not received the required Comi appointment making them successor trustees, pursuant to J.e. 
68-101 & I.e. 68-107 (case 33781 R. Vol I. p. 00063). 
The Taylor Brothers initially denied any court appointment was necessary for their 
appointment as sLlccessor trustees. After receiving the Motion to Dismiss, Carmie Taylor 
representing her husband Jolm Taylor filed a verified Petition for tbe Appointment of Trustees. 
The petition was executed by R. John Taylor on November 12,2004, as a verifica60n of the facts 
contained in the petition. Page 2 of the verified petition stated under oath, "the petitioner's 88-
year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this tIllst by virtue of the 
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ten11S of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement." (R. Voll. p. 000111). Prior to the 
Disclaimer Af:,'Teement, Helen Taylor was an income beneficiaries for her lifetime. Any 
distribution of income under the trust was discretionary with the trustees. Prior to the 
Disclaimer Agreement Helen Taylor had no light under the trust to receive any p011ion of the 
tmst COlVUS (R. Vol 1. p. 000431 1n.9 tluu 25). 
The Taylors obtained an ex-parte order from the probate comt on November 17,2004, 
appointing them as successor trustees, retroactively to June 10, 2004 (R. Vol 1. p. 000067 In. 6). 
On February 28, 2005, the Appellants filed appropriate pleadings before the probate cOUJi 
requesting that the ex-pmie Order dated November 17,2004 be set aside. On Ap1i118, 2005, the 
probate court, entered its Order dec1ming the ex-parte Order entered on November 17,2004 void 
(R. Vol 1. p. 000068111.3). 
On May 2, 2005, the Honorable Judge Cluistopher M. Beiter, entered an Order 
appointing R. John Taylor, Reed J. Taylor and Dallan J. Taylor as successor trustees of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust CR. Vol 1. p. 000068). At that probate comi hearing Jolm 
Taylor testified "my mother is the beneficiary oftlle trust" (R. Voll. pp. 000348). 
The Honorable Judge Wilper entered his Memorandum Decision and Order on 7128/05 
allowing the trust to amend its complaint after the Taylor brothers received the required 
appointment by the probate cou1i, and denying the Appellants' motion regarding that issue of 
law. Judge Wilper did however, &'Tant the Appellants' motion in part ruling that the Taylor 
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Brothers, now vvith standing as trustees, had waived rights to rescind the contract as "once a psrty 
treats a contmct as valid after the appearsI1ce of fscts giving rise to a ri ght of recision, the right of 
recision is \yaived."(R. Vol 1. p. 000649111. 10). 
rnle trust & the Taylor brothers moved for summmy judf,'111ent regarding the Appellants' 
counter-claim on May 13,2005 (case 33781 R. Vol 1. p. 84). On December 23, 2005, the 
Supreme Court, issued its Decision on the first appeal brought by the individual Taylors brothers 
(case 33781 R. Vol II. p. 227). The Supreme Court in its December 2005 Decision, beld in 
Taylor v. Maile L that beneficiaries such as the Taylor brothers bad standing to pursue claims 
based upon the allegations contained in their complaint filed in January 2004. In light of the 
Decision, Judge Wilper ordered additional bliefing regarding pending motions for summary 
judf,'1llent (case 33781 R. Vol II. p. 241). 
On January 13, 2006, Connie Taylor prepared and filed a motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint with a proposed verified Amended Complaint, which R. John Taylor 
executed as a verified pleading (T.E. 132 p. 478). The Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury 
Trial was filed on March 9, 2006, alleging "all of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust" (case 33781 R. Vol II. p. 260). 
Judge Wilper entered his Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, on 
February 13, 2006, which granted in part and denied in paJi the trust & the Taylor brothers' 
Motion for Summary Judb'111cnt ruling that the Appellants were entitled to pursue portions of 
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tbeir counter-claim, to wit: toriuous interference with contract claims, equitable estoppel, quasi-
estoppel, and their claim alleging a D'audulcnt transfer (R. Vol 1. pp. 000268,273 In. 10). 
On February 13,2006, the individual Taylor brothers, alleging they were beneficimies, 
filed tbeir J'v10tion for Summary Judb'111ent & Memorandum Brief (R. Vol I. pp. 000655, 000660). 
On May 15,2006, the district cOUli entered its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judb'J11ent on Beneficiaries' Claims (case 33781 R. Vol II. p. 281). The district court entered the 
"Judb'111ent on Beneficiaries' Claims" on June 7, 2006 (R. Vol 1. p. 000119). The Appellants 
filed their Lis Pendens on May 18, 2006 (R. Vol 1. p. 001052. An appeal was filed on December 
12,2006. Judge WiJper denied the Taylor Brothers' motion to remove the Vendee's Lien (R. Vol 
I. p. 001440). 
During the appeal, the Appell ants filed their independent action on December 31, 2007, 
alleging both equitable remedies and claims for damages (R. Vol 1. p. 0(0017). The Appellants 
filed their amended compJaint and filed a Lis Pendens on March 18,2008 (R. Vol 1. p. 001396). 
On October 14,2009 the Honorable Judge Wilper detem1ined, the Appellm1ts were 
entitled to maintain a vendee's lien against the propeliy to secure the retum of the purchase price, 
less costs which have been previously awarded by the Comi CR. Vol I. p. 001440). 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was the District Comi COITect in entering the Order dismissing the Appellants' Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial? 
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J ,\Vas the District Comi conect in denying the Appellants' Motion to Reconsider? 
3. the District Court conect in denying the Appellants' affinl1ative defense of litigation 
Plivilege which would have balTed the counter-claims ofthe Respondents? 
4. \Vas the District Comi conect in denying the Appellants' claims to set aside the 
"Judb'111ent based upon Beneficiaries' Claims", based upon "fi-aud upon the courf' andlor 
fi-aud upon the comi by "officers ofthe courf'? 
5. Was the District Court correct in dismissing the Appellants' claims based upon the 
fj-audulent-climinal conduct of the Respondents in obtaining "Judgment based upon 
Beneficiaries' Claims"? 
6. Did the "fraud upon the comi" committed by the "officers of the court" vitiate all 
subsequent legal actions? 
7. ,\Vas the Judgment entered on February 28,2011 supported by substantial, and competent 
evidence? 
8. Can the filing of a complaint give rise to a finding of an abuse of process and tOliious 
interference with prospective business advantage?' 
9. Was the verdict finding an abuse of process and tOltious interference with prospective 
business advantage improper as respondents failed to provide any evidence contradicting 
that the lis pendens were properly filed? 
10. Was the District Court conect in denying the Appellants' Motion for JNOV? 
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11. Was the District Court COlTect in a"varding costs and attomeys fees pursuant to I.e. §§ ] 2-
123 to the Respondents and denying the Appellants' costs? 
12. Are the Appellants entitled to attomey's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to rules 40 and 
41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and I.C. §§ 12-121, ]8-8701 et. Seq.? 
H. 
1. SUMMARY JUDGl\1ENT WAS IMPROPER AS 
TO THE APPELLANTS' CLAMS. 
JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY 
A. There was litigation misconduct committed by respondents that defeats the 
application of res judicata. 
An analysis of the facts is required to determine the extent of the fraudulent-criminal 
behavior perpetrated by the Respondents before Judge WiJper. The fundamental and essential 
truth is that the Taylor Brothers and their counsel1mew beyond certainty that the Taylor Brothers 
were no longer beneficiaries of the trust when they filed their verified pleadings in January 2006 
claiming they were residual beneficiaries of the trust. Tbe reason they provided such 
misrepresentations was to take advantage of the Idaho Supreme Court Decision rendered in 
December 2005, holding beneficiaries had standing to sue. The Respondents committed perjury 
and the subordination of perjury in obtaining the "Judt:,rment on Beneficiaries' Claims". The case 
of State v. Wolfi1.lm, 145 IeL 44,175 P.3d 206, eCt. App. 2007), commencing at p. 210 of] 75 
P.3d R, provides: 
The test for materiality is wbether the testimony probably would or could 
influence a tribunal or jury on the issue before it. The false statement relied upon 
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need not bear direct ly upon the ultimate issue of fact. A statement is matelial if it 
is material to any proper point of inquiry, and if it is calculated and intended to 
bolster tbe witness's testimony on some motelial point or to support or attack his 
credibility. The de,gree of materiality is not imp01iant.... It is sufficient that it was 
material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding. 
The Taylor brothers suffered the loss of their claims as beneficiaries by Judge Wilper's 
Order of dismissal in April 200-t In order for any claim to continue they had to obtain control of 
the trust from the nominated successor trustees, the Rogers, and file a new action on behalf ofthe 
trust. The Taylor Brothers sold their bilihrights to obtain control of the trust. 
After the execution of the Disclaimer At,.'Teement, John Taylor was clear and unequivocal 
under oath when he stated "my motlier, Helen Taylor, is the sale remaining beneficiary of the 
trust by l'jrtzre of the Disclaimer, Release and IndemlZity Agreement". The verified petition 
executed on November 12, 2004, requested the Probate COUli to appoint the Taylor brothers as 
trustees oftlle Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The petition prepared by Connie Taylor 
was executed by John Taylor as a verification of the facts. A verified pleading that sets f01ih 
evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the verifying signat01} is in substance an 
affidavit, and is accorded tIle same probative force as an affidavit. Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. 
Yack, 125 ld. 310, 870 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The Verified Petition was filed by the Taylor brothers as a result of Appellants' :Motion to 
Dismiss the trust's complaint. TIle motion alleged the Taylors had not obtained judicial 
appointment as Don-nominated successor trustees. Tbe Verified Petition before Probate COUli 
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obtained the result it was intended to achieve. The Probate Court on November 17,2004, 
appointed the Taylor brothers as successor trustees retroactive to the date June 10,2004. John 
Taylor not only provided his verified petition but he also provided clear and unequivocal 
deposition testimony that his mother was to receive any and all benefits of any fruits from the 
litigation (R. Vol 1. p. 2008) (tr. 2/3111 p. 3771n. 2; ir. 214111 p. 951n.19 thm p.961n.9). A 
judicial admission is a statement made by a party or attomey, in the course of judicial 
proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for proofby the 
opposing party of some fact. Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Id. 
761,86 P.3d 475 (::2004). 
John Taylor provided such declarations on two occasions prior to the opinion in Taylor v. 
Maile (1). Con11ie Taylor, acting for the benefit of the Taylors brothers in negotiating the teD11S 
of the Disclaimer Af,'Teement, provided declarations that her clients would be willing to give up 
their rights as beneficiaries CR. Vol 1. p. 000561). Beth Rogers signed an affidavit as requested 
in the letter fi'om Connie Taylor CR. Vol 1. p. 000541). 
TIle Disclaimer Af,'Teement, provides: "1.2 Disclaimer of All Other Interests .... l.2.3: 
Taylor .... hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the Trust, in favor of their mother, Helen 
Taylor, and hereby approve immediate distribution to Helen Taylor." The Af,'Teement recited the 
Taylors claimed an oV\!l1ership interest in the claim or cause of action by the trust. The Taylor 
Brothers did not say they considered themselves residual beneficiaries of that pOliion of the 
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corpus relating to the cause of action. Nor did they say they were retaining an interest in any 
future corpus. The Taylor Brothers as beneficiaries did not have any ownership interest in the 
cause of action initiated by the trust. The trustee(s) owned the chose in action. Trust property is 
owned by the trustee. Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Id. 737, 215 
P.3d 457 (2009). The beneficiaries ofa trust do not have an o\vnership in the property. 
The Taylor brothers were claiming an ownership interest in the litigation ,vhich they 
intended to pursue as a new cause of action as successor trustees. The Taylors wanted control of 
tbe new lawsuit because tlleir prior suit initiated as beneficiaries had been dismissed. 
Tbe judicial admissions clearly establish the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries. The 
Taylors' mother became the" tbe sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by virtue oftIle ten11S of 
a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement". The Taylors after the Decision in Taylor v. 
Maile (J) found it convenient to attempt to undo their judicial admissions. The Respondents 
knew the district cOUli had ruled plior to the Supreme Court Decision, tbat the trust did not have 
the remedy available ofbaving the real propeliy restored. The district cOUli stated, "once;] party 
treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of rescission, the light 
of rescission is waived" (R. Vol 1. p. 000649 In. 10). 
Not only were the Taylor brothers no longer beneficiaries of tIle trust in 2006, they did 
not represent the interests of their mother. Helen Taylor \vas never a represented individual or an 
interested party in any pali of the proceeding before Judge Wilper. The Taylor brothers 
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circulated written contracts to all beneficiaries which required beneficiaries to contribute to the 
cost of litigation if they \vere to be represented by the Taylor brothers. Helen Taylor never 
participated in the litigation which was brought by the Taylor brothers in January 2004. "CR. Vol 
1. pp. 000565, 569,570,571,574,575). 
The Taylor brothers' fi'audulent-criminaJ conduct directly influenced the district court in 
entering the "]udbrment on Beneficiaries' Claims". 111e Taylor brothers in their motion for 
summary jUdgment and their briefing were moving for summary judf,,'ment solely in their capacity 
as alleged "residual beneficiaries" (R. Vol 1. pp. 000655, 0(0660). On I\1ay 15,2006, the district 
comi entered its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficimies' 
Claims (R. Vol 1. p. 001355). The Order and resulting Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims had 
nothing to do with Helen Taylor. 
The primary object in interpreting a contract is to discover the intent of tIle paIiies, which 
should, ifpossible, be asceriained from the language oftbe document. Win ofMicbigan, Inc. v. 
Yreka United, Inc., 13 71d. 747, 750, 53 P.3d 330, 333 (1002). The objective in interpreting a 
contract is to asceliain and give effect to the intent of the parties. Luzar v. Westem Sur. Co" 107 
Id, 693, 697, 692 P.2d 337, 341 (1984). Where a contract is detennined to be C1mbi b'11ous, the 
interpretation oft11e document is a question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the pariies. 
Whether an ambiguity exists in a legal instrument is a question oflaw, over which an 
appeJ1ate court exercises fj'ee review. Cool v. Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass'n, 139 Id. 
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770, 772, 86 P.3d 484, 486 (2004). Where a legal instrument is found to be unambiguous the 
legal effect must be decided by the district court as a matter of law; it is only when that 
instrument is found to be ambiguous that evidence as to the meaning oft11at instrument may be 
submitted to the tinder of fact. Knipe Land Co. v. Robelison, 37002 (IDSCCI 2011). 
Appellants properly alleged criminal and fi-audulent misconduct on the part ofthe 
Respondents that removes res judicata as a bar to the Appellants' claims. Claims brought under 
I.R. c.P. 60(b) are 110t barred by res judicata because they are one of the recognized "avenues ... 
for attacking a judgment." Waller v. State, Dept. ofHeaIth and Welfare, 146 Id. 234,192 P.3d 
1 058 C:~(08). Allegations relating to a "fi·aud upon a cOUli" and/or acts which amount to criminal 
conduct and/or misrepresentations wan·ant a good faith argument that a constructive trust should 
be imposed as \veII as relief of the judf,'111ent based upon such criminal conduct. 
\Vhether to grant reliefunder Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)is committed to the 
discretion of the trial couri and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of the court's discretion. W. 
Cmty. Ins. Co. v. Kickers, Inc. 137 Id. 305, 306, 48 P.3d 634, 635 (2002). In reviewing whether 
or not a court abused its discretion this Court relies on a three-pm1 test: 
(1) whetber the trial cOUli cOlTectly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent 
with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial comi reached its 
detennination through an exercise ofreasol1. Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Id.640, 
115 P.3d 731 C:~005). 
The lower court did not ariiculate in its decision any appropriate basis for the denial of 
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equitable relief( R. Vol I 001374). The facts are ovenl/helming. The Taylors and their attorneys 
make a plima facie case against themselves solely 011 their own deposition testimony, verified 
pleadings and other declarations against interest. The judicial admissions and declarations 
against interest establish that there is a showing that the attomeys perf0l111ed "some additional act 
in the use oftbe legaJ process that is not proper in the ref,rular prosecution of the proceedings". 
Peljury and/or subordination of peljury is an act not perf0l111ecl in the proper course of legitimate 
representation of a client. See generally, Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Td. 826,243 P.3d 642 C.WI0). 
The Respondents were playing loose and fast with the judicial system wbicb demonstrated a 
tampering that is a wrong against the judicial institution and the public. Res judicata should have 
no application to the matter. 
B. Officers o/the court committed a '~fi'alld UpOI1 the court" that warrant5' the 
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims being set aside. 
Connie Taylor and her husband, R. 101m Taylor, were at all relevant times licensed Idaho 
attomeys and as such were "officers of the court". 
Vol 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60-21 (4)(b) provides: 
One of the distinguishing facts in the leading Hazel-Atlas case was the 
paIiicipatiol1 of a lawyer for one of the pmiy's in the creation as weIl as the 
presentation of the fi-audulent evidence relied on by the Patent Office and the 
Third Circuit. As a result, subsequent courts have stated that the participation of 
an officer of the cOUli in the fi'aud is either an essential element of fraud on the 
comi contributing to the subversion of the adjudication process or an altemative 
basis for finding fi-aud on cOUli. 
TIle Sixth Circuit has quoted, with approval, a definition of fi-aud on the comi that 
15 
consists of five elements: (l) conduct on tbe part of an officer of the cOUli; (2) that 
is directed to the "judicial machinery" itself; (3) that is intentionally false, wilfully 
blind to the truth, or is in reckless disregard of truth or falsity; (4) that is a positive 
averment or is a concealment when one is under a duty to disclose; and (5) that 
deceives the court. Thus, misconduct of an offIcer of the comi is an essential 
element offraud on the cOUli; but there is fraud on the cOUli only if this 
misconduct precludes proper adjudication by the court. 
The Ninth Circuit apparently treats misconduct by 3n officer of the COUli as an 
altemative basis for finding fi-aud on the court; an altemative to the definition 
involving subversion of the adjudication process as discussed in [aJ, above. The 
Ninth Circui t has quoted Moore's for the proposition that fi'aud on the court is a 
"species of fraud v/hich does or attempt to, defile the court itself or is a fraud 
pe11)etrated by officers of the cOUli'". 
The FOUlih Circuit has af,,'Teed. 
"Althougb peljury of a witness wi11110t suffice, the "involvement of all attomey, 
as an officer of the cOUJi, in a scl1eme to subom penury should celiainly be 
considered fi-aud all the cOUli" 
As has the Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit: 
"Since attomeys are officers of the cOUli, their conduct, if dishonest, would 
constitute fraud on the cOUli. 
The record clearly establishes "fraud upon the court" by officers of the COlIli. " Fraud on 
the court" is a claim that exists to protect the intei.:,rrity of the judi cial process, and therefore a 
claim for IhlUd on the court cannot be time-baiTed. See ]2, Moore's Federal Practice § 
60.2] [4J[gJ & 11.52 (3d ed.2009) (citing Lockwood v. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625, 634 
(D.D.C.1969). 
The affect oftlle fraudulent-criminal conduct was grave in the ultimate holding before 
Judge \Vilper. The plior litigation before Judge Wilper was consolidated with the cOUli having 
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two claims before it. One claim was on the beneficiaries' claims filed plior to the Disclaimer 
A.greement. The otber was the trust's claims filed after the Disclaimer }\~)Teement. Judge Wilper 
ruled the trust would be limited to only a potential claim for money damages (R. Vol I. p. 
000649 In. 10). Even after the Supreme COUli Decision in December ::W05, Judge Wilper in 
Febl11ary 2006 had allowed the equitable claims of the Appellants to proceed to trial against the 
trust CR. Vol I. pp. 000268, 273 In. 10). 
The effect of the fraudulent-climinal behavior prevented the Appellants from having their 
day in cOUli regarding their equitable claims against the trust for title and possession. After the 
fi'audulent-criminal behavior undertaken by the Taylor brothers led to the Judgment on the 
Beneficiaries' Claims, the cOUli did not allow SUcll balancing of equities. Mr. Maile testified that 
after the entry of the Order based upon tIle Taylor brothers' motion for summary judb'111ent, 
attempts were made before Judge Wilper to proceed with the equitable claims between the trust 
and Berkshire Investments' right to title and possession. Judge Wilper denied such balar1cing of 
competing equitable interests between the trust and the Appellants (Tr. 214/11 pp. 42 In. 7 thru 45 
In. 24; 46 In. J 6 t11m p.47). 
The lower cOUli was requested to take judicial notice ofJudge Wilpcr's Memorandum 
Decision and Order dated July 21,2006 which provided, "The comi finds that the effect of the 
Comi's imposition of a constructive trust 011 the Linder Road propeliy is the reconveyance of the 
propeliy to the trust and the quieting of the title in favor of the Trust". CR. Voll. pp. 001354, 
17 
001356 In. 7). Mr. lviJile testified that Judge Wilper, after the entry oftlle "Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claims" refused to consider the equities between the trust and the Appellants, as 
the judge concluded that the J udf,'111ent on Beneficiaries' Claims crcated a constructive trust and 
the equities between the trust and the Appellants were no longer at issue (Tr. 2/4111 p. 43 In. 22 
thTu p. 47 In.12). 
The Appellants had fully peri(l1111ed under the real estate contract with the trust as of 
January 4,2004 (prior to the Taylor Brothers' initial complaint as beneficiaries), had paid the full 
appraised value of the propeliy, had received verification 5'0111 the plior successor trustees Beth 
and Andy Rogers that the trust would be standing by the transaction, ane! had expended 
approximately $250,000.00 in development costs, largeJy after receiving such assurances fi'0111 
the nominated successor trustees (R, Vol 1. pp. 000281, 000499, 001139, 0006491n. 4) (Tr. 
214111 p. 31 In. 24 thTU p. 32). Where one party to a void a!:,'1'eement has fully perf 01111 ed, the 
cOUli will not require performance of the other pmiy, even though a money juclf,'111cnt will cffect 
the result, but will leave the pmiies wlJere it found them. McFall v. Arkoosh, 37 Id. 243, 246, 
215 P. 978, (1923), Finlayson v. Waller, 64 ld. 618, 134 P.2d 1069 (I 943), Tew v. Manwaring, 
94 Id. 50, 480 P.2d 896 (1971), BallYv. Pacific West Const., I11c., 140 lcl. 827, 103 P.3d 440 
(2004). Both the trust and the Appellants had fully perfo1111ed under the void contract. 
Part pcrformance can sive rise to estoppcl against the pmiy secking to void a transaction. 
See generally Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 rd. 485, 20 P,3d 
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21 (Ct. App. 2001). It is universally recognized that the statute of frauds is inapplicable to a 
contract fully perfonl1ed by both sides. Frantz v. Parke, 111 leI. 1005, 729 P.2d 1068 eCL App. 
1986), guoting WILLISTON § 528, at 72 7-28. 
There was full perf0I111anCe by the Appellants which should have been considered against 
any claim by the trust which sought to cancel the real estate transaction. The trust's nominated 
SLlccessor trustees(s) Beth and Andy Rogers had endorsed and approved the real estate 
transaction which they knew that their uncle Ted wanted and Berkshire relied upon their 
endorsement and approval of the transaction in making substantial improvements to the propeliy. 
The Taylor brothers and their attorneys' haudulent-criminal behavior precluded a proper 
adjudication by the court relating to the issues of estoppel between the Appellants and trust. 
Respondents Connie TayJor and JOIUl Taylor'S actions as "officers of the court" constitute 
a "fhlLld upon the COUli" that wammts the equitable powers of the COUli to set aside the 
Judb'111ent on Beneficiaries' Claims. 
C. The crimil1aVti'{Uu/ulent conduct Fitiates all subsequent proceedings. 
A "fraud upon the cOUli" makes tbe orders and judb'1nents of that cOUli null and void. An 
attempt to commit "fraud upon the COllli" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State 
of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354, 192 N.E. 229 (1934). Fraud vitiates any transaction 
based thereon and will destroy any asselied title to propeliy no matter in what f01111 the evidence 
of such title may exist. Batterton v. Douglas I\1ining Co., Ltd., 20 rd. 760, 120 P. 827 (1911). 
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The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judf:,'111ents as well 
as to contracts and other transactions. Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 
N 259 (1929), In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App.2c1393 (1962). 
A decision produced by fi'aLId upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never 
becomes final. Fraud vitiates a judgment caused by the active agency of some party to the 
proceeding, as the cOUli is misled and deceived as to the facts upon which it attempts to 
administer the law, and the mistake is equally efficacious in procuring a wrong. Trim v. Trim, 33 
So.3d 471 (Miss. 20 10). Any subsequent orders or judf:,'111ent entered after such fi'audulent-
criminal behavior should be declared null and void. 
D. The Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims should be set aside because AppeUants 
acted reasonably in filing their fraud action. 
There is no express time limit for filing an independent action seeking relief from a 
judf:,'111ent other than that the action must be brought within a reasonable time. Campbell v. 
Kildew, 141 Id. 640, 115 P.3d 731 (2005). The detenl1ination whether an independent action 
was brought within a reasonable time is ordinarily a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of 
fact. Waller v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 146 Id. 234, 192 P.3d 1058 (2008). 
The Appellants discovery the fi'audulent!criminal behavior while preparing their opening 
briefin Taylor v. Maile 2. The Appellants raised the misrepresentations as a standing issue in an 
attempt to defeat the Taylor brothers masquerading as beneficiaries. The Idaho Supreme COUli 
found the Taylors had standing pursuant to the Disclaimer Agreement. When an issue of 
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standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but upon the party who is 
seeking the relief Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 TeL 635,641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989), Scona 
Inc. v. Green Willow Trust, 133 TeL 283,286,985 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1999). 
The Appellants' complaint requests that the jud;'111ent be set aside based upon the 
Respondents' cril11inal-£l-audulent actions and the title quieted in Berkshire Investments LLC. 
The lower cowi failed to detell11ine a reasonable time (R. Vol I 0(1374). There was no 
detennination of what constitutes a reasonable time. There is no express time limit for filing an 
independent action seeking relief £l-om a jud!:,'111ent. Res judicata does not appJy to the present 
matter. 
E. There were no damages until the «Judgment Oil Beneficiaries' Claims". 
There can be no claim preclusion if there is not ripe for judicial detennination a valid 
cause of action. Idaho First Natl. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Id. 266, 283-84,824 P.2d 
841, 858-59 (1991). The time when a cause of action accrues may be a question of law or a 
question offact, depending upon whether any disputed issues of material fact exist. Where tIl ere 
is no dispute over any issue of material fact regarding when the cause of action accrues, tbe 
question is one oflaw for detenl1ination by the court. Reis v. Cox, 104 Id. 434, 660 P.2d 46 
(1982). The date for when a cause of action accrues may be a question of fact or law. Jemmett 
v. I\1cDonald, 136 Id. 277,279,32 P.3d 669, 671 (200 I). 
The McNichols, case, supra, provides: 
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we conclude that a cause of action against one party's opponent's attomey in 
litigation, based 011 conduct the attomey committed in the course of that litigation, 
may not be properly instituted prior to the resolution of that litigation, even where 
the allegedly ag,grieved party believes that the attomey in question has been acting 
outside the legitimate scope ofrepresentation and solely for his o'vvn benefit.... 
Until tl1e Underlying Case is resolved a court cannot detennine whether any 
tortious act was committed, let alone acts constituting the aiding and abetting of 
those alleged t01iious acts. 
Res judicata does not apply to the present matter when there are allegations offi'aud 
and/or criminal behavior in obtaining a judf:,'111ent. There could be no cause of action ripe for 
judicial detenl1ination until the underlying case was resolved and the Appellants sustained 
damages. The claims should not be determined baITed as a matter oflaw. At the very least tIle 
accrual of the cause of action should be detennined to be a factual issue in dispute. Respondents 
Clark & Feeney, Paul T. Clark, and Connie Taylor represented the interests of the Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust Dal1an Taylor, R. John Taylor, together with Reed Taylor and acted in 
conceri with tbe Co-Respondents. 
The Appellants after the McNicl101s, supra, decision, requested the lower court to 
reconsider its earlier order f,'Tanting Respondents' Summary Judf:,'111ent and denying the 
Appellants' Motion for Summary Judi:,,'111ent. The lower cOUli denied the Motion to Reconsider to 
al10w the Appellants' claims to continue to trial (Tr 10/29110 p.131n. 7). In addition tbe lower 
court denied the Motion to Reconsider to bar Respondents' claims based upon litigation privilege 
which the cOUli determined did not apply to pariy litigants (Tr 11/30/10 p.19 In. 8 thru p. 20 In. 
21). The trial COUli must consider new evidence that bears on the COlTectness of an interlocutory 
order if requested to do so by a timely motion under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
. Procedure. PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Id. 631,200 P.3d 1180 (2009). The 
lower court should have applied the principles of the McNicbols, supra, case, by alluwing the 
Appellants' claims to proceed to trial and baning the Respondents' counter-claim. 
F. There can be no application of res judicata [)(n;ed upon the litigation misconduct by 
the respondents. 
The case of Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Id. 122, 128, 212 P .2d 103 J, 1034 (1949) holds 
that res judicata will not bar a claim when fi-aud is involved. Commencing at page 128 of 70 Id. 
Reports, the Idaho Supreme Comi declared: 
One of the oldest and most universally accepted juridical principles is that 
embraced in the doctrine of res judicata. In the absence o.ffraud or collusion a 
judgment is conclusive as between the parties and their Plivies on all issues which 
were (or should have been) litigated in the action .... 
Generally speaking, the fraud which will invalidate a jud1:,'111ent must be extrinsic 
or collateral to the issues tried, by which the aggrieved party has been prejudiced, 
or prevented from having a fair trial. It is not sufficient to charge only intrinsic 
fraud, or that which is involved in the issues tried, such as the presentation of 
perjured testimony. 
A pOliy committing fi-aud will not be afforded the protection of res judicata. The 
Appellants never had a trial before Judge Wilper. There was no presentation of testimony at 
trial. The Respondents' committed perjury and subordination of perjury sUlTounding the 
preparation and execution of the V:::rified Amended Complaint filed January 13, 2006 and 
committed false pretenses in the supporting pleadings that resulted in the J udf:,'111ent on 
Beneficiaries' Claims. 
47 Am. ]ur. 2d JUd.~:,'111ents § 537, Fraud or Collusion provides: 
Fraud by a pariy will not undenl1ine the conclusiveness of a judgment unless the 
fi-aud was extrinsic, that is, it deprived the opposing party of the 0PPOIiunity to 
appear and present his or her case. With respect to extrinsic fraud, the doctrine of 
res judicata will not shield a blameworihy defendant fi-om the consequences of his 
or her own misconduct. Accordingly, the principles of res judicata may not be 
invoked to sustain fraud, and a judt,'111ent obtained by fraud or collusion may not 
be used as a basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata. 
The Appellants were deplived their day in comi solely based upon the fi-audulent-criminal 
behavior ofthe Respondents. As stated, in the Wolfi-um, supra, tIle statement is material if it 
might have been used to affect the proceedings. 50 C.J.S. Judt,'11lents § 532, provides: 
§ 532. Fraud, call Llsiol1, or peljury 
A judgment obtained by fi-aud may, however, be void under some circumstances, 
and subj ect to collateral attack, as where such fi-aud appears on the face of the 
record or goes to the method of acquiring j wisdi ction. Likewise, thejudgmellt 
may be attacked collateralZv wherefhlUrI has been practiced ill the vel:V act {~r 
obtaining thejudgment, or 011 the party against whom thejudgment was 
rendered, so as to prevent him from having a fair opportunity to present his 
case. Judgments obtained by extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, fi-aud may be attacked 
collaterally. The extrinsic fraud which is required as a basis for collateral attacks 
on judt,'111ents is defined as fi-aud which is collateral to the issues tried in tbe case 
wbere the judt,'111ent is rendered (emphasis added). 
Judge Wilper prior to the material misrepresentations by the Respondents, precluded the 
trust £I-om rescinding the real estate transaction. The claims of the trust were limited to a cl aim 
for monetary damages. The Taylor brothers assertion that they continued as beneficiaries of the 
trust after the Disclaimer At,'Teement was a material misrepresentations \vhich prevented the 
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Appellants from defending their purchase of the propeliy based upon the fair market value of the 
property and pursuing their claim for damages. Mr. Maile testiiied that Judge Wi1per had 
precluded any attempt to balance equities between tbe trust and the Appellants, reasoning that 
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims as a constructive trust defeated any trial between the trust and 
Berkshire. (Tr. 214/11 pp. 42111. 7 thru 45 tn. 24; 46 In. 16 thTU p.47) (R. Vol I. pp. 001354, 
001356 In. 7). 
The peljury, tbe subordination of peljury, and obtaining money by false pretenses, is 
established in the record by the swam testimony, and judicial admissions of the Respondents. 
49 C.J.S. Judf,'11Jents § 310 provides: 
.... In order for a paTiy to obtain relief under such a rule, the pwiy seeking relief 
must prove the most egregious conduct involving cOHuption of the judicial 
process itselfby establishing to the satisfaction of the trial judge that there W(]S 
peljured testimony which influenced the judgment of the cOllli . ... 
1n any event, some comis hold that a judgment may be vacated for peljury under 
certain conditions, as where a party obtains a judgment by that paliy's own willful 
perjury, or by the use of false testimony, which the pmiy knows at the time to be 
false. 
The district comi entered its "Jud!:,'111ent on Beneficiaries' Claims", solely upon the direct 
material misrepresentations of the Taylor brothers and their counsel ofrecord. Tbere is no 
dispute that Cormie Taylor prepared the petition and notarized her husband's signature on 
November 14,2004 as she did with the January 13,2006 verified amended complaint. 
A non-client may bring a cause of action against an attorney for abuse of process. 
The absolute privilege that protects attorneys from liability for defamation OCCUlTing in the 
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course of a judicial proceeding does not provide an attomey with an absolute defense to liability 
for abuse of process. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process § 21 Attorneys. All Respondents had 
actual knowledge of the true facts as to who was the beneficiary of the trust, consequently there 
is responsibility for damages by all Respondents. 
G. Tbere has been no determination on the merits ofthc defendants' crh:ninal 
activity or the fraudulent misrepresentations. 
Appellants raised the issue of the Taylors' standing in the prior ligation before the Idaho 
Supreme Court. The contention is simple, the Taylors and their counsel of record committed 
multiple criminal acts and committed fraud in representing the Taylor Brothers' status as 
beneficimies which was the very foundation to the ultimate "Judgment on Beneficiaries' 
Claims". When an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, 
but upon the pmiy who is seeking the relief. Miles, supra. 
The Supreme Court did not rule on the substantive issues of the criminallfi'audulent 
behavior of the Taylors and their counsel before Judge Wilper's COLlli nor the resulting damages 
sustained by the Appellants. The Idaho Supreme COUli did not have to consider the same on the 
merits, since the Supreme Court detel111ined the Taylors had standing in case CV 2004-00473D 
reserved by an "interest in the litigation" as set forth in the "Disclaimer, Release & 
Indemnification Agreement" dated July 15,2004. The material misrepresentations, and the 
criminal behavior committed by the Respondents, and the damages sustained by the Appellants 
have not been considered on the merits, nor could they have been. Tieor Title Co. v. Stanion, 
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144 ld. 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007) provides: 
There are five factors required tor collateral estoppel to bar re-Iitigation of an 
issue decided in an earlier proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier 
decision was asselied had a full and fair 0pPOliunity to litigate the issue decided in 
the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the plior litigation was identical to the 
issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was 
actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment 011 the 
merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted 
was a pmiy or in privity with a pmiy to the litigation. 
There has been no detennination of the issues of fi'aud and climinal bchavior of the 
Respondents, and the resulting damages sustained by the Appellants. The Appellants had no 
claim for relief until they sustained damages. There is no bar to the Appellants' claims based 
upon res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
H. Different operative facts precludes res judicata & collateral estoppel. 
The Appellants never had a cause of action against the Respondents until the \ilrrongfu1 
actions of the Respondents resulted in a loss of tile propeliy. The time of taking occurs, and 
hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the full extent of the Appellants' loss of use 
and enjoyment of the propel1y became apparent. McCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners 
128 Id. 213, 912 P.2d 100 (1996). There can be no application ofthe doctrine of res judicata, as 
the Appellants had no cause of action that stemmed fi'om the same operative facts which where 
involved in the 2002 real estate transaction. See generally Sage Willow, Inc., v. Idaho Dept. of 
Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831,835-36, 70 P.3d 669, 673-74 (2003). 
Res judicata may apply to claims that arose out of the same "transaction or series of 
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transactions" as the previous litigation. U.S. Bank v. Kuenzli, 134 Id. 222, 999 P.2d 877 (2000) 
The Appellants were damaged solely by the wrongful conduct ofthe Respondents in January 
2006. The Appellants' claims for relief are unrelated to the real estate transaction of 2002. The 
operative facts involving the prior litigation, involved an alleged breach offiduciary, allegedly 
paying less than market value and wllether a conflict of interest of a successor trustee required 
notice to be given in 2002 to beneficiaries of the trust. The present action is based upon the 
wrongful conduct of the Respondents in the misuse of the judicial institution itself which 
occUlTed in 2006. 
2. THE JURY VERDICT 'VAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, SUFFICIENT 
AJ~D COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND MUST BE STRICKEN. 
A. As a matter of law the mere filing of a complaint cannot form a basis for any 
claims of abuse of process or intentional interference with a business advantage. 
The tmst and the Taylor brothers acImowledged the basis for their counter-claim was 
predicated upon the filing of the peJjury complaint. As Connie Taylor admitted in trial in support 
of an objection, we're here to decide the process for filing the complaint" (Tr. 21411 1 p. 68 In. 15). 
The AppelJants filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude evidence of any tOliioDS action which 
related to the reasonableness of filing of the perjury complaint (R. Vol 1. p. 0]917). During the 
trial, the cOUli ovelTuled an objection relating to the question posed to Mr. Lewis' "do you have an 
opinion as to whether a reasonable attomey could have had any reasonable expectation of WiI1l1ing 
that case" (Tr. 2/2111 p. 128 In. 23 thm p. 1 29 In. 13). The lower COUli allowed the witness to 
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render his opinion. 
The COUli in Badell v. Beeks, 115 Id. 101, 104, 765 P.ld 126,129 (1988), dismissed an 
ab Llse of process claim, noting: "Even assuming, arguendo, that a factual issue exists with regard 
to an ulterior, improper purpose, there is no evidence of subsequent misuse of process after it was 
lawfully issued." Idaho courts have not extensively discussed the fact that the "improper" element 
of the t01i of abuse of process requires a subsequent wrongful act, but the COLlli in Badell, supra, 
cited the decision in Bickelv. A1ackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Iowa 1978) for this 
proposition. In that case, the COLlli stated: 
"Abuse of process, ... , is the intentional use ofIegal process for an improper 
pUll10se incompatible with the lawful function of the process by one with an 
ulterior motive in doing so, ... The improper use which is the essence of the t01i 
is ordinarily an attempt to secure fi'om another some collateral advantage not 
properly includable in the process itself, and is, in Prosser's words, 'a f01111 of 
extortion' in which a lawfully used process is pervelied to an unlawful use." 
Prosser states: 
Abuse of process differs fi'om malicious prosecution in that the gist of the t01i is 
not commencing an action or causing process to issue without justification, but 
misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than that 
which it was desii,,'11ed to accomplish. Prosser, Law of To lis, 4th Ed. § 121 (1972) 
Abuse of process requires an improper PLlll10se which "usually takes the f01111 of 
coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding 
itself ... ". 
As comis have declared in many other jUlisdictions, an abuse of process requires more 
than the mere filing of a lawsuit. Seidner v. 155 I Greenfield Owners Assn. 108 Cal. App.3d 895 
at p. 904 (1980), Tellefsen v. Key System Transit Lines 198 Cal. App. 2d 611, 615, 17 Cal. Rptr. 
919 (1961). Tellefsen, supra, 198 Cal. App.2d at pp. 615- 616, provides, some definite act or 
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threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an object not legitimate in the use of the process, 
is required before a pmty can sue for abuse of process. A process is not abused unless there is a 
definite act or thTeat beyond the scope of the process. As a result, the mere filing of a complaint, 
regardless of the motive, cam10t serve as the basis for an abuse of process cause of ac6oI1. 
Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital, 217 Cal. App.3d 796, 826 (1990). The 
overwhelming majority of states hold that the mere filing of the complaint is insufficient to 
establish the tort of abuse of process. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737, 752 (D. Nev.1 (85). 
In this case, there was no proof that subsequent to the filing of the peljury complaint and 
lis pendens associated with it, that there was any subsequent misuse of process by the Appellants. 
Thus, there was no basis in law or fact suppOliing the jury's verdict on the abuse of process 
claim. There was no proof that Appellants did anything "independently \vrongful" that supporied 
the jury's verdict on the intentional interference claim. As noted in Highland EnteqJrises, Inc. v. 
Barker, 133 Id. 330, 338, 986 p.2d 996, 1004 (1999), that tort requires proof that "(4) the 
interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the 
defendant interfered for an improper pUll)ose or improper means)." 
There was a eomplete Jack of evidence that the lis pendens in either case were 
independently wrongful. There can be no legitimate claim of damages connected to any 
wrongful act stemming from tIle filing of a lis pendens. No testimony \vas protrered that the 
filing of the lis pendens was frivolous or wrongful. The pelJury complaint sought a quiet title 
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action and a constructive trust; both claims allow as a matter of Jaw the filing of a lis pendens. 
one testified that the lis pendens before Judge Wilper was wrongful or improper, in 
light of the fact that 11le trust continues to owe $400,00.00 to the Appellants. TIle evidence 
established a legitimate light to maintain the lis pendens (Tr. 2/4111 pp. 49 In. 17 thru 51 In. 1). 
The Appellants filed their Notice of Vendee's Lien on August 3, 2009 (R. Vol 1. p. 001428). 
On October] 4,2009, Judge Wilper specifically authorized a vendee's lien to be filed to protect 
the retu111 oftlle $400,000.00 CR. Voll. p. 0(1440). On November 5, 2009, the Appellants filed 
their Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien before Judge Wilper CR. Voll. p. 001445). The 
foreclosure was stayed by Judge \Vilper, pending the outcome of the present matter (R. Vol 1. p. 
001(14). 
The Appellants were lawfully entitled to maintain a lis pendens on their vendee's lien 
foreclosure as any litigant would be entitled to record a lis pendens in any foreclosure 
proceeding. A plain reading of I.e. § 45-1302 supports the Appellants' position that a lis 
pendens is proper until the vendee's lien is foreclosed upon. The foreclosure of vendee's lien as 
with any lien foreclosure is addressed in I.e. § 45-1302, which provides: 
Detennination of All Rights upon Foreclosure Proceedings. 
In any suit brought to foreclose a mOIigage or lien UPOll real property ... 
the plaintiff..., claiming or appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, or 
interest in or to any part of the real or personal property involved therein, and the 
COUli shall, in addition to f,'Tanting relief in the foreclosure action, detenDine the 
title, estate or interest of all pariies thereto in the same manner and to the same 
extent and effect as in the action to quiet title. 
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Judge Wilper entered his Order on March 1,2007 which authorized the Appellants' lis 
pendens (R. Vol 1. p. 001408). The Appellants since the entry of that Order, have had a lawful 
light to foreclose a vendee's lien. A vendee's lien is afforded tbe same right as any other type of 
lien foreclosure referenced in I.e. § 45-1302 and is given the same effect as a quiet title action. 
Appellants were entitled to record a lis pendens on their claim for a retu111 of the purchase price, 
as provided in I.e. § 45-1302. The Respondents admitted that they had not returned the purchase 
price, and would not retum the purchase plice unless the Appellants af,'Teed to dismiss their 
potential right to an appeal (R. Vol 1. p. 001475). 
In addition the Appellants properly filed a lis pendens in the lower cOUIi's proceeding 
alleging a constructive trust, & Idaho racketeering violations. Any action "affecting the title to 
real property" clearly allows the filing of a lis pendens by an interested pmiy in order to protect 
their interest in the propeliy subject to the litigation. Such actions include suits attempting to set 
aside a fi-audulent conveyance of real propeliy to establish a constructive tmst over real estate. 
See generally, Bengoechea v. Bengoechea, 106 Id. 188, 677 P.2d 501 (Ct. App.1984), where a 
claim for constructive trust relating to real property allegedly obtained by fi-aud .::t1lowed the filing 
oflis pendens. A constructive trust can be imposed where property was obtained either 
fraudulently or through violation of a fiduciary duty. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Id. 467,469,886 
P .2d 772, 774 (I 994), Witt v. Jones, 1 II Id. 165, 722 P .2d 474 (1986). An action to impress a 
constructive trust on realty affects title to that property, so that a notice of lis pendens may be 
filed. Ross v. Specialty Risk Consultants, Inc., 240 Wis.2d 23,621 N.W.2d 669, 677 (Ct. 
App.2000). 
The Idaho Racketeeling Statute provides a remedy for the wrongful conduct of the 
Respondents, which provides a court may enter an order divesting the defendants of any interest, 
direct or indirect, in the real propel1y obtained in violation ofLC. Chapter 18 Title and 
specifically section 1 8-7805( c)( d)( 1). A filing of a lis pendens is appropriate in light of the 
allegations set f011h in the Appellants' Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. 
In reality the Appellants "v ere entitled to maintain the lis pendens tlmmghout these 
proceedings including the appeal as reasoned by Judge Wilper in the companion case CR. Vol 1. 
p. 001408). The Appellants voluntarily released the lis pendens in the present matter 
immediately after Judge Greenwood issued his Decision dismissing the Appellants' complaint 
CR. Vol 1. p. 001421). 
There was no evidence presented by the Respondents to show that the lis pendens in 
Judge Wilper's case remained of record for any improper time or purpose. Nor was there any 
evidence at trial that the lis pendens filed in the ClllTent action was improper. The publication of 
the notice of lis pendens is not defamatory. It merely infol111S the public that the propel1y is 
involved in litigation. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Id. 547,165 P.3d 261 (2007). 
The case of Dalley v. Dykema Gossett PLLC, 287 Mich. App. 296, 788 N.W.2d 679 
(2010) involved a second lawsuit alleging the plaintiff and the attomeys in the first suit 
improperly pursued their litigation. The Dalley cowi stated in dismissing the claims of abuse of 
process and t01iious interference with a business relationship, ot p. 324 of287 Mich. App., "In 
order to succeed under a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship, the plaintitls 
must allege that tbe interferor did something illegal, unethical or fi-audulent. There is nothing 
illegal, unethical or fraudulent in filing a lawsuit, whether groundless or not". 
The issue of whether or not the actions complained of are or are not "wrongful" in this 
context was for the eOUli to detemline in defining the issues. The issue for the jury to detenl1ine 
is whether or not tbe alleged tortfeasor acted in the manner alleged. The decision in Carter v. 
Carter, 143 leI. 373, 146 p.3d 639 (1006) established the right of a paliy to institute legal action to 
protect their economic interests, even jf it resulted in interference with an economic expectancy 
of another. 
An abuse of process claim requires proof that the tOlifeasor filed process not proper in the 
course of the proceedings. The fact that the lower comi dismissed the perjury complaint does not 
alter the fact that the Notice of Lis Pendens 'Nas properly filed in conjunction witb the complaint 
seeking to quiet title to the real property. There was no proof that the Appellants did anything 
wrong beyond resorting to the legal process in an attempt to set aside an earlier judf,'l11ent and/or 
advancing a complaint seeking damages. As a matter of law there was no proof that the actions of 
the Appellants were independently wrongful. The jury verdict must be set aside as a matter of 
law. 
13. Litigation Privilege is a defense to the Respondents' counter-claim. 
The Appellants' in a motion in limine requested tbe trial court to limit the Respondents' 
counter-claim to facts that could be considered beyond the litigation privilege (R. Vol 1. p. 
OOJ 823). The District court reasoned that the litigation privilege applied to attorneys but not to 
litigants appearing pro se (Tr. 11130/10 pp. 191n. 7 thru 20 In. 21). 
The case of Wynn v. Em-in, 163 Wa. 2d 36 I, 181 P .3d 806 (Wash. 2008), examined the 
application of the litigation privilege and held: 
The CaIifomia Supreme Cotlli explained the purposes of the rule (which is 
codified in that state): 
The principal purpose of the litigation privilege is to afford litigants and witnesses 
the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed 
subsequently by derivative t01i actions. 
The rule promotes the effectiveness of judicia I proceedings by encouraging "open 
channels of communication and the presentation of evidence" in judicial 
proceedings ... 
Ultimately, the rule protects litigants, whose interests at stake in a case range 
across the entire spectrum ofpropeliy, family, and individual circumstances, by 
encouraging the full, truthful, and complete testimony of witnesses. 
The immunity afforded to statements made during the course of a judicial proceeding 
extends not only to the pmiies in a proceeding but to judges, witnesses, and counsel as well. Cox 
v. Klein, 546 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1989). What the above holdings establish is that the courts 
allow the privilege to attomeys advocating on behalf of clients, the litigants themselves, and 
witnesses involved in pursuing cOUli proceedings. 
The lower cOUli rejected Appellants' Motion in Limine reasoning that Mr. Maile CllldMrs. 
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MajJe 'v ere litigants and the privilege applied to attomeys. The evidence presented by the 
Respondents and their argument to the jury throughout the case was directed at Mr. Maile's 
actions as an attorney, representing Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Maile. John Taylor 
testified that he did not think tbat Colleen Maile did anything wrong (tr 2/2111 p. 44 In. 6). Over 
the objection of the Appellants, Dr. Lewis offered his opinion regarding the expected actions of a 
reasonable "attomey," and offered no opinion regarding the expected actions of a reasonable 
person. The McNic1lOls, supra, holding is on point and applicable to the facts in this case 
regarding tbe Appellants' litigation privilege and the lower court should have determined that tbe 
litigation privilege applied to the Appellants. The filing of the pcrjUly complaint and the 
recording of tbe lis pendens were subject to a litigation privilege. The jUly verdict should be set 
aside. 
The case of Weitz v. Green, 1481daho 851,230 P.3d 743, (2010) provides: 
As the finding of slander of title in tIllS case was premised upon a statement 
made in the complaint, a necessary first step in litigation, where such statement 
was related to the underlying claim agJinst Respondents, that statement is deemed 
immune. (emphasis added). 
The Weitz, supra, case has important implications in light of the law in the McNichols, 
supra, case. The Respondents' contentions related to an alleged improper filing of Lis Pendens 
and tbe alleged misuse of judicial process relating to allegations contained in the amended 
complaint filed by Appellants. As the Weitz & McNic1101 cases hold, such statements which are 
set forth in a lis pendens filed of record or contained in allegations of a complaint are immune 
iI-om liability if they "had a reasonable relation to t1le cause of action of that proceeding". 
V{hether protected under a vendee's lien or a claim for a constructive trust, the pleadings and the 
lis pendens were reasonably reI ated to the claims for relief which were properly pursued in the 
course oflitigation in both cases. 
The common theme from other jUlisdictions is the detem1ination of whether there is fraud 
or criminal behavior in considering the extent of the litigation privilege. This is also seen in our 
Supreme Court's reasoning, in the McNichols, surpa, case and is important for the cOUli's 
analysis. The Respondents failed to allege any specific or general theories of fraud and/or 
criminal behavior pe11)etuilted by the Appellants. As stated in McNichols, supra, "Reed's failure 
to make specific factual pleadings is pmiicularly fatal here. It appears most likely that Reed is 
alleging that the goal of the conspiracy was fraudulent, and civil conspiracy must therefore be pled 
with parii cuI arity under Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs, Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 990-92 (9th 
Cir. 2006)". 
The Jitigation privilege extends to litigants and attomeys. McNichols, supra, holds: 
In fact, "at coml11on law, the litigation privilege blanketed all paJiicipants in the 
comi system; private atto111eys were treated no differently th3n judges, 
govemment lawyers, and witnesses .... This privilege is predicated on the long 
established principle that the efficient pursuit of justice requires that attomeys and 
litigants must be pem1itted to speak and write freely in the course of litigation 
without the fear of replisal through a civil suit for defamation or libel. 
The litigation privilege is presumed to exist. The detem1ination of the privilege is a 
question of Jaw. The lower comi in denying the motion indicated it would be addressed by 
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instructing the jury (tr 11130/10 p. 19 In. 1). Such a detennination is a question of law not to be 
decided by ajury. The existence of a privilege is a question of Jaw for the court, which an 
appellate court reviews for cOlTectness, giving no deference to the trial court's dete1111ination." 
Staley v . .Tolles, 2010 UT 19,20080492 (UTSC). Ifthere is no dispute as to the operative facts, 
the applicability of the litigation privilege is a question oflaw. Any doubt about whether the 
privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it. Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa 
Monica, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 41 Cal.4th 1232, (2007). 
The Respondents failed to allege any specific or general theories of fraud pel11etuated by 
the Appellants. Without such allegations in their Amended Counterclaim (R. Vol l. p. 001688) 
and the Respondents' failure to provide any proof at trial of any alleged criminal or fi-audu1ent 
behavior, the Appellants are entitled to tIle absolute litigation privilege, as annunciated in the 
McNichols, surpa. The Respondents failed to present evidence to limit the application of the 
litigation privilege. The jury verdict should be set aside. 
C. The district court erred in failing to grant the JNOV. 
111 determining whether a JNOV is proper, the court assumes without deciding that any 
disputed facts are tme, and considers wllether those facts suffice as a matter of law to suppOli the 
verdict. Such a detel111inatiol1 is reviewed by the appellate comi under the same standard as the 
district comi. Karlson v. Hanis, 140 Id. 561,567,97 P.3d 428,434 (2004). The comi reviews the 
facts as iftbe moving pariy had admitted any adverse facts, dra'vving reasonable inferences in favor 
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of the non-moving pmiy. Gillingham Const., Inc. v. Newby- Wiggins Const., Inc., 142 Id. 15, 20, 
121 P.3d 946,951 (2005). 
Whether the trial comt should have entered a judb'11lent notwithstanding the verdict is 
purely a question of bw. Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker, 150 Tel. 240, 245 P.3d 992 (2010). Based upon 
the reasons set forth above, tIle lower court was in enOl' in not entering a JNOV. 
3. COURT ERRED IN AVVARDING FEES AND COSTS TO THE RESPONDENTS. 
A. There '''las no basis for an award of attorneys fees and costs to the Respondents. 
The district comt elToneously awarded attomeys fees to Respondent attomeys, pursuant to 
12-123. It is provided in I.e. § 12-123 that the COUlt "may award attomey fees" on the condition 
that the court follow the procedure outlined in the statute. In reviewing an award of fees pursuant 
to I.e. §§ 11-121 or 12-123, the appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Webster 
v. Hoopes, 126 Td. 96,878 P.2d 795 (Id. App. 1994). 
There is no dispute that tIle Taylor brothers and their attomeys knew perfectly well that the 
Taylor brothers had disclaimed their interest as beneficiaries in the trust as established by the 
verified pleadings, deposition testimony and declarations against their interests. The attorneys had 
written letters, prepared verified petitions, where the true facts were established. The attorneys sat 
through depositions with their clients, who reiterated the position that their mother was the sole 
beneficiary and would be receiving tIle full benefits of any award from litigation. Their clients 
never provided any cOlTections to their deposition testimony in which they represented their 
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clients (tr 2/3/1l p.378 1n.9 thTU 20). 
The Respondents were playing fast and loose with the judicial process in perpetrating their 
criminal conduct. A tI-aud upon the court was alleged which was well b'Tounded in fact and law. 
Mr. Lewis was not even aware that tlle Appellants were seeking equitable relief (tr 2/2/11 p.187 
In.1 thm p. 188 In.4). The entire course of the litigation must be taken into aecount and if there is 
at least one Jegitimate issue presented, attomey fees may not be awarded even though the losing 
paJiy has asselied other factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or ,vithout 
foundation. Coward v. HadJey, 246 P.3d391 C::010), Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Td. 224, 235, 220 
P.3d 580, 591 (2009). 
Where a case involves a novel legal question, attomey fees sbould not be b'ranted under 
I.e. § 12-121. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Id. 611, 614, 67 P.3d 90, 93 (2003). 
However, a comi may pursuant to I.e. § 12-123 may sanction fi-ivolous conduct designed to 
harass or maliciously injure another paJiy in a civil case. Campbell v. I(jldew, 141 Idabo 640, 115 
P.3d 731 (2005). I.C. § 12-123(2)(b) allows comis to award reasonable attomey fees to a pmiy in 
a civil action that incuITed the fees because Offlivolous conduct. Conduct is frivolous if: (1) it 
serves merely to harass or maliciously injure a pmiy; or (2) it is 110t supPOlied by fact or a good 
faith arf:,'1lment in law. I.C. § 12-J23(1)(b). Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County 
Highway Dist., 148 Id. 688,227 P.3d 942 (Idaho App. 2010). The Appellants advanced good 
faith arguments in filing their peljury complaint. The Appellants are protected by the litigation 
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privilege. An action is not deemed to have been brought frivolously simpJy because it ultimately 
fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116 Id. 687,688,778 P.2d 809, 810 (1989). In deciding whether an 
award of attomey's fees is proper, "the sole question is whether the losing party's position is so 
plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation". Sun ValJey 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 ld. 87, 92, 803 P.2d 993,998 (1991). 
The lower cOUli awarded all attomeys fees requested by Clark & Feeney, even tl10se fees 
incuned after tIle filing of its counter-claim which was voluntarily dismissed. The case of Magic 
Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Id. 558, 808 P.2d 
1303 (1991), provides that where there are multiple claims and multiple defenses, it is not 
appropliate to seb'regate those claims or defenses for the purpose of awarding attomey fees under 
I.e. §12-121. TIle claims and defenses were interwoven and fees should not have been awarded. 
Respondent attomeys voluntary dismissed their counterclaim. The lower court awarded 
fees and costs beyond the date ofthe entry of the dismissal of the peljury complaint. Much of 
what "vas incurred after that date related to the preservation of Respondent attomeys' counter-
claim which was voluntarily dismissed. The Respondents should not have been awarded their 
fees. 
B. The Offer of Judgment defeated any award of fees and costs to the Respondents 
and Appellants shou1d have been awarded their costs. 
Respondent attomeys filed their Amended Answer and Counter-Claim on March 13,2009 
(R. Voll. p. 01030). Appellants served an Offer of Judb'111ent on November 16,2009 in the 
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amount of $55,000.00 (R. Voll. p. 02346). During the time peIiod between the filing of the two 
pleadings, Respondent attomeys claimed fees for $8,827.50 and costs for $25.50. A Judgment 
obtained by the trust "was $28,437.36. The combination of the Judt,'111ent and fees and costs 
asseIied for the time period prior to the filing of the Amended Answer and Counter-Claim is 
$54,632.77 which was less than the amount offered in the Offer ofJudgment ($55,000.00). 
The Supplemental Affidavit provided that $34,854.50 was incuITed for attomey's fees up 
to the date of the filing of the Offer of Judgment 011 November 16, 2009 (R. Vol I. p. 02490). 
The initial affidavit actually demonstrates that attomey's fee and costs from March 13,2009, (date 
their Amended Answer and Counter-Claim was filed), up to the date of the Offer of Judgment 
were in the amount 0[$8,853.00 (R. Vol 1. p. 02314). This is important for the cOUli's analysis 
because Clark and Feeney's counterclaim involved the same issues which related to the defense to 
the peIjury complaint. StewaIi v. McKamin, 141 Idaho 930,120 P.3d 748 (Id. App. :W05). Clark 
& Feeney had to advance the argument that the application of res judicata was blatantly apparent. 
The expelis who testified at trial disagreed upon that point. Where there are multiple claims and 
multiple defenses, it is not appropIiate to set,'1-egate those claims or defenses for the pUI1)ose of 
awarding attomey fees. 
There vvas a mixture of attomeys fees rel8ted to prosecuting the counter claim and defending 
Appellants' claims, all of which involved issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel, consequently 
the motion for costs and attomeys fees submitted by Respondents should have been denied. TIle 
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Appellants should have been awarded their costs. 
4. THE 
APPEAL. 
ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
Pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 41, an award of attomey fees on appeal is appropriate, when the 
prevailing party is entitled to attomey fees at the trial court level, pursuant to I.e. § 12-121, see 
generally, Houston v. Whittier, 147 Id. 900,216 P.3d 1272 (Idaho 2009). I.e. § 18-7805 provides 
the comi with one of the appropriate standards for the deten11ination of attorneys fees. 
§ 18-7805. RACKETEERING CIVIL REMEDIES 
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a pattem of racketeering 
activity may file an action in the district court for the recovery of three (3) times the actual 
damages proved and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attomey's fees. 
Idaho Code, § 18-7805 & § 12-121 provide the basis to award attomey fees to the 
Appellants. The Appellants should be entitled to their attomeys fees and costs incuned herein. 
TV. CONCLUSION 
The Appellants properly advanced legal claims against the Respondents for equitable relief 
to set aside a judgment and a proper claim for damages. The application of res judicata to the 
facts aUeged is misplaced. The dismissal of the Appellants' claims inappropriately led to a jury 
verdict against the Appellants and should be set aside. The Judf,'111ent entered against the 
Appellants was rendered improperly as there were I egitimate and well reasoned principles to 
assert claims against the Respondents based upon their criminal-fraudulent behavior in obtaining 
tIle Judb'11lent on Beneficiaries' Claims. TIle Respondents were not entitled to their costs and 
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attorneys fees incUlTed. The Appellants are entitled to their costs and attorneys fees incuned. The 
matter should be remanded to allow tbe Appellants their day in court on their legitimate legal 
claims of misconduct committed by the Respondents. 
DATED this day of July, 2011. 
for 
Appellants, Berkshire Investments, Colleen 
Maile. 
Appellant, Thomas G. Maile. 
V. 
CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day ofJuly, 2011, I mailed two (2) tme and 
conect copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF, by placing the same in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson 
900 WashinE::,:rt:on St. Suite 1020 
Vancouver, \Vashington 98660 
Mark Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
Boise, TD 83701 
eX) u. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
eX) u. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
(!£v~jJ 
CHRIST T. TROU~counsel for Appellants. 
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APPENDIX '*A" TO APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF 
I. Respondent Connie Taylor drafted a letter to Bmi Harwood on April 14, 2004 which 
stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries of the trust 
unless Beth will affinn her prior factual statements in the fonn of an affidavit and agree 
to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. Ifwe aren't able to reach an agreement on 
that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax 
retums". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One Exhibit "B" deposition of Beth Rogers 
referencing deposition exhibit 39 -R. Voll. p. 000561). 
II. In response to the Motion to Dismiss before the Honorable Judge Wilper, the Taylors by 
and their counsel of record, Connie Taylor, filed their verified petition in the probate 
court on November 12, 2004, requesting the probate court to appoint them as trustees of 
the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The petition was executed by R. John Taylor 
as a verification of the facts contained in the petition. Page 2 of the velified petition 
states under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole 
remaining beneficiaTY of this trust by virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and 
Indemnity Agreement." (Exhibit "A" to the Verified Amended Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial- R. Voll. p. 000111)(emphasis added). 
III. Mr. R. John Taylor was sworn under oath and provided testimony before the Honorable 
Judge Beiter on May 2,2005 and commencing at page 14, In 4, testified: 
Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is that you want to serve? 
A. "Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always thought it was a 
valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the beneficiary of the 
trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim." DUling that same hearing 
Mr. Clark provided in his closing argument before Judge Beiter on June 5, 2005 
provided: page] 7, In 12: 
MR. CLARK: "Yes. Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based upon, first, the 
af,'Teement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that the Taylors should serve as 
co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same agreement, have a guarantee in the 
disclaimer. So they have some interest in the proceeding. Their mother stands to gain 
and, thereby, they have an interest in the proceeding." 
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One Exhibit "A" transcript of probate court May 2, 
2005 hearing-R. Vol I. pp. 000348, 000350). 
IV. The deposition of Reed Taylor provided the following testimony under oath: 
Q. Through this lawsuit, if the jury ultimately finds in favor of the plaintiffs in this 
matter, is your mother going to get anything? Do any of the proceeds from any Judgment 
that's entered in this lawsuit - A. She will probably get it all. 
Q. My question is: In that first lawsuit, although you are a named plaintiff, if that were 
to -- if the Supreme Court were to reverse the Summary Judgment that was entered, and 
it goes to trial and you prevail, if I'm understanding what you've told me -- all right? --
quote, your understanding is you don't get anything; everything goes to your mother? 
A. My intent is -- I'm not going to say exactly how it's going to be disbursed. My intent 
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would be for my mother. 
Q. In the second lawsuit, the one with the Trust, who gets the money if you prevail? 
A. Well, like I said, as far as, uh -- I haven't talked to, specifically, the ones that are out 
oftown. As far as John and I are concerned, uh, we're doing it for our mother, so ... 
Q. SO you and your brothers are not going to get anything? 
A. We're not looking for money out of it, if that's where you're going 
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One Exhibit "C" pages 132, 133, 134, ofthe deposition 
of Reed J. Taylor, taken on January 31,2005 -R. Voll. pp. 000566, 000567). 
V. The deposition of Dallan Taylor provided the following testimony under oath: 
Q. What was the purpose, then, of you executing the signature page on Exhibit 24 that 
relate to the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement? Could you just explain to 
me, in your own words, what Exhibit 25 accomplishes? 
A. Vie are the disclaimer of all interests. It is being signed by -- 1, dash, 2, dash, 1 by 
Fishers, which disclaims all the interest in the Trust in favor of their mother, Helen (sic) 
Fisher, so that they will distribute the money in the Trust to Hazel Fisher. 1.2, dash, 2, 
Seeley, is so the money, uh -- the children are released (inaudible) -
THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. "The children are released" what? Speak up. 
THE \VITNESS: -- their interest in the Trust so that the money can be distributed to 
Joyce Seeley. And Taylor, all children are disclaiming interest in favor of their mother, 
Helen Taylor, so that she can get the remainder of her assets in the Trust. 
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Pmi One Exhibit "F" pages 74, 75 of the deposition of 
Dal1an Taylor, taken on September 9, 2004 -R. Voll. p. 000582) 
VI. The deposition of John Taylor provided the following testimony under oath: 
Q. Exhibit 26 of Beth Rogers' deposition, that's the Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial. That's signed by your brother and your wife; is that correct. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you have a chance to review that document? 
A. I did. 
Q. Before it was actually filed? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you concur in the language of the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what is it that the plaintiffs want out of this litigation; what is it they seek? 
A. We want the difference in -- wel1, the diffcrence in the value of the property and the 
amount that it was sold for. And we believe that is $6 to $800,000. 
Q. Okay. You've also sued for damages. Is that the damage claim that you're wanting? 
A. Yes, essentially. 
Q. Is that you want out of this lawsuit? 
A. 6- to 800,000. Yes. 
Q. Anything else you want out of this litigation? 
A. We would -- we would like to see that, uh -- uh, punitive damages are added to that. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And we would like to see, uh, you eventually disbarred. 
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Q. Okay. Anything else? 
A. No. That's enough. 
Q. Now, there is an allegation that you want a recision ofthe contract? 
A. As an aItemative. Yes. 
Q. But you want the money first? 
A. It would be easier. It goes to my mom. 
(Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed December 31,2010, page 81 of the deposition ofR. 
John Taylor, taken on December 14, 2004-R. Vol 1. p. 2008)( emphasis added). 
VII. The Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Taylor v. Maile I on December 23,2005. 
VIII. On March 9, 2006, the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, and 
prepared by the co-defendant attomeys. Page 1 of the Verified Amended Complaint 
states under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; 
DaHan Taylor is a resident of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaintiffs are residual 
beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust." (The verified amended complaint is 
annexed to Amended complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "B"- R. Voll. p. 
000 I 86) (emphasis added) . 
IX. The Taylors acting with and through their attomeys on February 13,2006, filed their 
Motion For Summary Judgment On Beneficiaries' Claim. The first sentence of the 
motion states, "Come Now Plaintiffs Reed, DaHan, and John Taylor (hereafter referred to 
as "the Beneficiary Plaillt~frs") (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "L"- R. 
Vol 1. p. 000655)(emphasis added). 
X. The Taylors again referring to themselves as Plaintiff Beneficiaries filed the Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim on 
February 13, 2006. On page 5 ofthe Memorandum the Taylor Brothers state, "The 
Plaintiff Beneficiaries are entitled to summary judgment on their constructive trust claim 
against the Defendants pursuant to the Idaho Supreme COUli decision dated December 
23,2005." (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "M"- R. Vol 1. p. 000660). 
XI. The district court entered the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim" on June 7, 2006 (The 
Judgment is annexed to Verified Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as 
Exhibit "C"- R. Voll. p. 000192) (emphasis added). 
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3. Release of Trustees - Estimated Exoenses. The undersigned hereby reielse and 
discharge Andrew T. Rogers and Beth J. Rogers from ail claims or causes of action, whether 
known or unknown, he/she may have against them (i) in their capacity as trustees of the Trust, or 
(ii) arising in any way out of their service as trustees of the Trust. The undersigned further 
acknowledge that the trustees have distributed, and he/she has received, all of the property, 
money and benefits to which he/she is entitled under the terms of the Trust, except an amount 
which shall not ex.ceed Five Thousand Doilars ($5,000), which has been retained fJr the sole 
purpose of paying :lCcounting, legal and other expenses associated with the Trust Any surplus in 
such retainage wiH be distributed to the beneficiaries proportionately. The undersigned 
acknowledge the financial information he/she has received will constitute a final accounting; and 
he/she waives any right to a court-approved formal final accounting. 
4. Resi,mation of Trustees. The undersigned understand Andrew T. Rogers and Beth 
1. Rogers intend to resign as trustees of the Trust, leaving in the Trust the Claims described in 
Section 1.1 above; and the undersigned approve of such resignation. The undersigned further 
understand a.'1d agree that the successor trustee, Garth Fisher, will decline to serve as trustee, and 
that Reed 1. Taylor, Dallan 1. Taylor a'1d R. John Taylor will be nominated and appointed to 
serve as successor co-trustees of the Trust. 
5. Indemnification. Taylors, jointly and severally, agree to defend, indemnify and 
hold harmless 0) Andrew T. Rogers and Beth J. Rogers, and (ii) all of the other beneficiaries of 
the Trust against all suits, claims, expenses, costs, attorney's fees, losses or monies that they may 
incur or be required to pay as a result of any lawsuit by Taylors, or any of them, or their 
successors, based upon the Claims, including, without I:mitation, any third-party claim or 
counterclaim advanced by the defendants. 
6. Enumeration of Beneficiaries. This will certify the twenty-five (25) individuals 
identified below as signators constitute all of the beneficiaries of the Trust. Exhibit A attached is 
a graphical depiction of the relationship of the signators and grantor Theodore L. Johnson. Blair 
Johnson predeceased the Grantor, Theodore Johnson, leaving no issue; and the beneficial interest 
of Blair Johnson therefore iapsed. 
7. Bindini! Effect. This instrument shall be effective as of the latest signature by all, 
and Qot less than all, of the signators indicated below; and this instrument shall ae binding upon 
the heirs and successc,rs of the parties. 
8. Artornev's Fees. If any party commences legal proceedings for any relief against 
the other party(ies) arising out of this agreement, the prevailing party(ies) shall be entitled to an 
award of his/her/their legal costs and expenses, including, but not limited to, re2.sonable 
attorney's fees as dctenT',lned by the court. The prevailing party(ies) shail be that parrj receiving 
substantially ,he relief sought in the proceeding, whether brought to final judgmeLt or not. 
9. Countemarts and Facsimile. This instrument may be execu:ed in several 
counterparts and all so executed shall constitute one instrument, binding on all the parties hereto, 
even though all the parties are not signatories to the original or the same counterpart. A signed 
document transmitted by fax shall be ~he eouivalent of execution and delivery of an ')figinal 
5 igned document. 
DfSCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDE?vfNHY AGREEMENT - 2 
000612 
10. Entire Ae:reement. This agreement, together with all exhibits attached hereto and 
other agreements and written materials and documents expressly referred to herein, constitutes 
the entire agreement bet\veen the parties with respect to the matters set forth herein. All prior or 
contemporaneous agreements, understandings, representations, warranties and statements, oral or 
written, are superseded. 
II. Further Assurances. The parties agree to perform such rJrther acts and to execute 
and deliver such additional documents and instruments as may be reasonably required in order to 
carry out the provisions of this instrument and the intention of the parties. Each of the signators 
warrants and represer.ts thct in executing this instrument he/she is deaiing wi~h hislher sole and 
separate property. 
12. Governing Law. This agreement shall be governed, construed and e:JfClrced in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. 
13. Modification/Waiver. P;'o modification, waiver, amendment or discharge or this 
instrument shall be valid unless the same is in writing and signed l:lY all parties. 
HAZEL FISHER Dated 
GORDON E FISHER Dated 
GAR TH 1. FISHER Dated 
JUDITH F CRA VI/FORD Dated 
JOYCE SEELY Dated 
DOROTHY S DAYTON Dated 
J DAVID SEEL Y Dared 
DISCLAlfvlER, RELE.AS:::: & INDE:MNrTY AGREEMENT - 3 
000613 
DISCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
1. Disclaimers. 
I.I Disclaimer of Claims bv Certain Beneficiaries. Except for those 
individuals identified in the last sentence of this Section 1.1, each of the beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust, UTD November 4, 1997 (hereafter referred to as the "Trust"), 
hereby disclaims, in favor of the Trust, any ownership interest hefshe may now or in the future 
have in any claims Of causes of action by the Trust or the trustees of the Trust against attorney 
Thomas G. Maile, or his successors or aff:liates, including, without limitation, Thomas 
Maile, IV, Colleen Maile, Thomas Maile Rea! Estate Company and Berkshire rnvestments, LLC, 
in connection with the purchase of real property from the Trust ("Claims"); and by this 
Disclaimer, the same individuals confirm in the Trust complete ownership and control of any 
such Claims. No warranty or representation is made as to the existence or efficacy of such 
Claims. The following beneficiaries do not join in this disclaimer: Helen Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, 
DaHan J. Taylor, Mark J. Taylor, Gloria Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. John Taylor. 
1.2 Disclaimer of All Other Inrerests. 
1.2.1 Eisher. Gordon E. Fisher, Garth 1. Fisher and Judith F. Crawford, 
comprising all of the children of Hazel Fisher, hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the 
Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section 1.1 above, in favor of their mother, Hazel Fisher, and 
hereby approve immediate distribution to Hazel Fisher. 
J .2.2 Seely. J. David Seely, Karl 1. Seely, Dorothy S. Dayton, Janet S. 
Denison and Nathan L. Seely, comprising all of the children of Joyce Seely, hereby disclaim all 
interests whatsoever in the Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section 1.1 above, in favor of 
their mother, Joyce Seely, and hereby approve immediate distribution to Joyce Seely. 
1.2.3 TaYlor. Reed 1. Taylor, DaHan J. Taylor, Mark J. Taylor, Gloria 
Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. John Taylor, comprising all of the children of Helen Taylor, 
hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the Trust, in favor of their mother, Helen Taylor, and 
hereby approve immediate distribution to Helen Taylor. All of the individuals identified in this 
Section 1.2.3 are sometimes hereafterreferred to as "Taylors". 
') Receiot in Full - Income Tax. The undersigned acknowledge receipt in full of all 
property, money and benefits which hefshe is entitled to receive from Andrew T. Rogers and 
Beth J. Rogers, in their capacity as trustees of the Trust. This includes a full share of the final 
payment received in 2004 from the sale to Thomas G. MailefBerkshire Investments, LLC, in 
2002, of the real estate located in Ada County. (Except for the Taylors, to the extent they are 
retaining a beneficial interest in the Claims), the undersigned have no further expectation of 
receiving anything from the Trust. The undersigned further understand that the trustees have not 
paid income tax or. the final payment received in 2004 and that hefshe will receive an IRS form 
K-l indicating his/her share of such tax, which is to be included on the beneficiary's own federal 
and state income tax retums for 2004. 
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